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SUMMARY
Cameroon’s for est sector has for many decades been characterized by industrial, large-scale, concession-based and export-oriented timber 
production. Over the past two decades, many innovative regulations have been adopted that largely responded to the external requests of the 
country’s technical and financial partners. By using data and information collected over more than a decade, complemented by semi-structured 
interviews, we assess how some of the most relevant regulations have been implemented. Findings indicate that over the years, a clear discon-
nect appears between what is promised and adopted in the rules and regulations governing the industrial sector, and what is actually imple-
mented on the ground. We discuss how such disconnect may have originated and how it may negatively impact the sustainable development 
of the industrial forest sector. We propose some technical and policy options that may improve the sector’s management, positively impact 
Cameroon’s international image and possibly strengthen the country’s engagement in international regimes such as FLEGT and/or REDD+.
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Les défis techniques et politiques du secteur forestier industriel au Cameroun
P.O. CERUTTI, J. NGOUHOUO POUFOUN, A. KARSENTY, R. EBA’A ATYI, R. NASI et T. FOMETE NEMBOT
Pendant plusieurs décennies, le secteur forestier camerounais a été caractérisé par une exploitation industrielle du bois d’œuvre dans les conces-
sions forestières à grandes surfaces, l’essentiel de la production visant principalement à satisfaire la demande extérieure du bois. Durant les 
deux dernières décennies, un grand nombre de décrets, d’arrêtés et de règlements innovants ont été adoptés, en grande partie sous l’impulsion 
des partenaires techniques et financiers internationaux du pays. A partir des données d’exploitation recueillies pendant plus d’une décennie, 
complétées par une série d’interviews semi-structurées des parties prenantes à l’exploitation forestières, cet article fait une évaluation de la mise 
en œuvre des dispositions règlementaires les plus importantes du secteur. Les résultats indiquent une nette différence entre les dispositions 
des textes règlementaires du secteur forestier industriel et les pratiques observées au fil des années. Nous discutons les déterminants d’une 
telle différence ainsi que ses impacts potentiels sur le développement durable du secteur forestier industriel. Nous proposons quelques options 
politiques et techniques qui pourraient améliorer la gestion du secteur forestier industriel, renforcer les engagements pris par le Cameroun dans 
des régimes internationaux tels que le FLEGT et/ou la REDD+ et avoir un impact positif sur l’image du Cameroun sur la scène internationale.
Los desafíos técnicos y políticos del sector forestal industrial en Camerún
P.O. CERUTTI, J. NGOUHOUO POUFOUN, A. KARSENTY, R. EBA’A ATYI, R. NASI y T. FOMETE NEMBOT
El sector forestal de Camerún durante muchas décadas se ha caracterizado por la producción industrial a gran escala, basada en la concesión y 
en madera orientada a la exportación. Durante las últimas dos décadas, muchas regulaciones innovadoras que se han adoptado en gran medida 
respondieron a las solicitudes externas de socios técnicos y financieros del país. Mediante el uso de datos e información recogidos durante más 
de una década, complementados con entrevistas semi-estructuradas, evaluamos cómo se aplicaron algunas de las regulaciones más relevantes. 
Los resultados indican que a lo largo de los años aparece una desconexión clara entre lo que se promete y se adopta en normas y reglamentos 
que regulan el sector industrial, y lo que realmente se implementa. Se discute cual puede ser el origen de tal desconexión y cómo esta puede 
influir negativamente en el desarrollo sostenible del sector forestal industrial. Proponemos algunas opciones técnicas y políticas que podrían 
impactar positivamente en la imagen internacional de Camerún y posiblemente fortalecer la participación del país en los regímenes internacio-
nales como FLEGT y/o REDD+.
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2009, PSRF 2010, PSRF 2011, PSRF 2012, PSRF 2013, 
PSRF 2014). 
Yet, although available information may indicate progress 
with the integration of the SFM principles in the legal frame-
work, and with the adoption of measures that were requested 
by the 1994 Forest Law and its implementing decree (Repub-
lic of Cameroon 1994, Republic of Cameroon 1995), much 
still remains to be done in terms of implementation on the 
ground (e.g. Mbile and van der Meer 2009, Hoare 2015, 
Cerutti et al. 2016). The disconnect between adopted mea-
sures and actual implementation is the focus of this article. As 
it will be argued, this situation is, at least partially, the result 
of the conditions under which the sector has been governed, 
which have changed significantly over the years and which 
may be split into two major periods, before and after 2006. 
The reforms adopted between the end of the 1980s and 2006 
were introduced within the framework of three successive 
structural adjustment plans (SAP), negotiated between the 
government of Cameroon and its international lenders, 
notably the World Bank and the Paris Club (Topa et al. 2009). 
In 2006, Cameroon reached the so-called completion point 
of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative 
(AfDB and OECD 2007). The country’s debt was slashed 
and restructured, and many of its main creditors, who had 
a prominent role in driving past reforms, lost their financial 
leverage. 
Concurrently, international efforts to prevent illegal 
logging, and notably the EU’s Forest Law Enforcement, 
Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan, took centre 
stage in driving reforms in Cameroon’s forest sector. A 
FLEGT Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) for the 
production and export of legal timber was first informally 
discussed and then negotiated and signed during 2004–2010 
(European Commission 2007). Thus, over the years, the EU 
– together with much financial engagement from Germany 
(PSFE 2011) – replaced the World Bank as the main external 
driver of reform in the forest sector. 
For practical purposes, in VPA-related discussions, the 
focus of reforms shifted from sustainable forest management 
(SFM) to a “more pragmatic focus on legality” (European 
Commission 2004, p.1); however, the main objectives of the 
forest policy established in the 1990s remained unaltered, 
with SFM being the ultimate target of both the EU and the 
government of Cameroon (e.g. MINFOF 2015).
While the technicalities of engagement between interna-
tional partners and the Cameroonian government on various 
processes differed (e.g. the SAPs had a much broader macro-
economic scope than the FLEGT Action Plan), we theorise 
that the leitmotif behind the reforms in the forest sector has 
remained largely unchanged over the years. In general terms, 
such leitmotif has been one based on the perception of 
externally imposed reforms that have duly been accepted and 
nominally adopted by the recipient Ministry (Brunner and 
Ekoko 2000), but then internally resisted (often by both state 
officials and part of the private sector) and eventually only 
partially implemented. Hence the disconnect between what 
some may assess as a successful rate of adoption and a 
INTRODUCTION
Large-scale concession-based forest operations have been 
the predominant model of the industrial forest sector in the 
Congo basin for many decades. The concessionary model 
finds its origins in colonial times (Karsenty 2007), but the 
current governance regime applied to it largely stems from 
two processes that have concurrently been developing over 
the past two decades. On the one side, a series of macro-
economic structural adjustments (Brunner and Ekoko 2000, 
Atyi et al. 2009). On the other side, the political commitment 
to the sustainable management of forest resources that was 
firmly put into the international policy agenda at the Earth 
Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992. The current impor-
tance of the concessionary model in the Congo basin is illus-
trated by the sheer numbers that it represents: As of 2013, 403 
logging concessions covered about 50 million ha (Bayol et al. 
2013), the related forest operations generated direct employ-
ment for about 55,000 people, and the contribution to the 
countries’ GDP averaged about 6% (de Wasseige et al. 2012).
In the region, Cameroon was the first to draft a forest code 
based on the sustainability principles agreed at the 1992 Earth 
Summit. It thus has the oldest and most mature of the forest 
policies and legal frameworks, used as a blueprint for the 
codes adopted by other Congo basin countries. Several 
important regulations targeting the industrial forest sector 
were introduced in the first half of the 1990s. First, land deeds 
had to be issued to demarcate the permanent forest domain, 
which must remain forested to maintain the biodiversity of 
the country. The permanent domain includes Forest Manage-
ment Units (FMU) and protected areas, and in contrast to the 
non-permanent forest domain, cannot be converted to alterna-
tive uses, such as agriculture (Republic of Cameroon 1994). 
Second, management plans based on ecological, economic 
and social sustainability principles were made mandatory for 
FMUs. The law gives responsibility for preparing manage-
ment plans to the Ministry of Forests, but such task was even-
tually delegated to logging companies (Cerutti et al. 2008). 
Third, a new fiscal regime was adopted that would increase 
state revenues, as well as the benefits enjoyed by local popu-
lations. Fourth, local processing of harvested resources was to 
be favoured over exports of raw materials, with the aim of 
increasing employment and local livelihoods (Essama-Nssah 
and Gockowski 2000, Topa et al. 2009).
Overall, available information on the evolution of the 
forest policy over the last two decades seem to indicate at 
least a partial implementation. A partial log export ban was 
adopted in 1999, increasing local processing and the export of 
processed products. In 2000–2015, almost all available FMUs 
had been attributed at least once, and although only a minor-
ity had received permanent land deeds, over 80% of them 
were harvested following the prescriptions of approved 
management plans (MINFOF 2015). Over the same period, 
about EUR 140 million were paid out by logging companies 
and redistributed to rural councils and the communities neigh-
bouring logging concessions (PSRF 2004, PSRF 2008, PSRF 
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low rate of implementation, generally explained with the 
recurrent reference to a lack of political will, leadership (e.g. 
Mbile and van der Meer 2009), or commitment (e.g. Essama-
Nssah and Gockowski 2000) on the part of the Cameroonian 
government.
With the help of available data, we discuss how such 
tension between nominal adoption and actual implementation 
has played out in the operationalization of reforms, and 
we gauge some lessons for the future development of the 
industrial forest sector in Cameroon.
Purpose
Within the general framework of this Special Issue, the pur-
pose of this article is twofold. First, it conducts a stocktaking 
exercise on available data and information to assess the status 
of some of the most important forest reforms, two decades 
after their introduction, notably those promoting the imple-
mentation of SFM and those aimed at increasing the financial 
contribution of the sector to the State’s coffers. Second, it 
aims to draw some lessons for future policy developments. 
In particular, it reviews the reforms that are still standing, 
those that have been eroded and those that have not made any 
progress since inception, and discusses the reasons behind 
success or failure, as well as their impacts. 
As explained in the introductory article to this Special 
Issue and as it will be argued in this article, one of the biggest 
problems for the forest sector to be considered in national 
development policies, and possibly one of the reasons also 
negatively impacting actual implementation, is that the entire 
sector has historically been identified only with its industrial 
part, like a jigsaw puzzle identified by only one of its pieces. 
Indeed, it remains of the utmost importance to be able to 
compare the forest sector as a whole to other sectors, such as 
the mining or agribusiness ones. Especially so, when one 
notes that while in the 1990s the forest sector was seen as 
the engine of development and growth (Essama-Nssah and 
Gockowski 2000), today the EU and partners operate against 
the background of a radically different national agenda, with 
the government now investing both technical and political 
capital in agribusiness and mining – often at the expense of 
forested areas (Republic of Cameroon 2009).
Yet, we maintain that such a comparative exercise will 
only be possible once a more coherent view of the forest 
sector as a whole will be established, which is the overall 
purpose of this Special Issue. For this reason, it is outside the 
scope of this article to conduct a comparative assessment with 
other sectors, e.g. the mining or agribusiness ones. 
The following section briefly introduces the methodology 
applied to data collection. Next, two sections present largely 
quantitative results linked to the major policy and financial 
innovations introduced by the 1994 legal framework. The 
final section discusses some lessons that can be learned and 
offers some conclusions and recommendations for the future 
management of Cameroon’s forests.
METHODOLOGY
The data and information presented in this paper have been 
collected in various ways. First, a literature review of existing 
studies and reports was conducted. Most of the relevant 
reports on the past two decades of forest policy discussions 
and implementation belong to the grey literature, have not 
been publicly disseminated, and can be found either on the 
shelves of ministry offices or on the hard-disks of public 
officials. Such literature has been painstakingly collected by 
the authors over more than two decades spent working on the 
Cameroonian forest sector, and was thus made available for 
this study. This literature review has been complemented 
by interviews and specific data collection for this paper, 
conducted in 2013–2015 with various ministries, including the 
Ministry of Forests and Fauna (MINFOF) and the Ministry 
of Finance.1
Second, 23 one-to-one semi-structured interviews com-
plemented by field visits were conducted with key unions, 
syndicates and professional organizations (4), logging 
industry representatives (7), local communities (7) and civil 
society organizations (5). The interviews focussed on peo-
ples’ recollection of policy events over the past two decades, 
as well as on the various data collection procedures the inter-
viewees’ companies or organizations were subjected to, and, 
when possible, on the availability of data in their premises.
Third, official accounting and financial data on the forest 
sector and logging companies were requested from, and gra-
ciously made available by, various departments of the Ministry 
of Finance, such as the Division of Large Enterprises, the 
Medium-scale Enterprises Tax Office and the Tax Pilot 
Centres in the capital city, Yaoundé, and in Douala. Most 
such data are recorded annually in the Statistics and Fiscal 
Statements (DFS) made by logging companies to the Ministry 
of Finance. In total, the DFS of 77 companies (from about 
2008–2011) were made available. Data were released under a 
confidentiality agreement which stated that they could only 
be made public in aggregate form to maintain the anonymity 
of participating logging companies.
Fourth, volumetric data about timber exports were made 
available by MINFOF through the annual reports produced by 
its Littoral Region division, which records exports from the 
main port of Douala. The declarations of exporting compa-
nies (90–100, depending on the year) are recorded and 
aggregated per product (logs, sawn-wood, plywood or 
veneer), destination and species. These data have been used to 
estimate processing rates and the contribution of the sector to 
the national economy.
The next two sections present the results linked to the 
major policy and financial innovations introduced by the 
1994 legal framework, namely the concessions’ requirements 
to register land deeds and to prepare management plans, and 
the sector’s new fiscal regime.
1
 The MINFOF assumed its current name and acronym in 2004. Previously, it was the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MINEF). In this 
paper, the acronym MINFOF is used throughout for clarity’s sake.
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management plan respectful of the social, environmental and 
economic requirements defined by the law.
In reality, MINFOF allowed gazetting and attribution to 
be run as parallel processes, with the latter often occurring 
earlier than the former. This has resulted in logging compa-
nies being granted FMUs or starting harvesting operations 
where the negotiations about boundaries and compensation to 
local communities had yet to occur. By 2003, 72 FMUs had 
already been granted with only five being gazetted and no 
management plan approved (FIGURE 1). 
A decade later, in 2015, all available FMUs – including 
some newly created in recent years – had been attributed at 
least once. However, the majority of gazetting and manage-
ment plan approval occurred during 2004–2006 (FIGURE 1). 
Partly, this trend may be understood as a decade-long learning 
process, starting with the adoption of the 1994 law, during 
which MINFOF staff learned how to master and eventually 
implement the new regulatory framework. Yet, when one 
compares Figure 1 with the political and economic situation 
of Cameroon in those same years, another and – we argue – 
more compelling explanation emerges.
This explanation takes into account the external pressures 
exerted on the government of Cameroon, and particularly 
MINFOF, by multilateral donors and lenders during 1989–
2005. It was during those years that three subsequent SAPs 
and – most importantly – their corollaries of related condi-
tional matrices influenced the decisions taken in many 
sectors of the Cameroonian economy (World Bank 1989, 
ADB 2002, ADF 2005, Ongolo and Karsenty 2015). Since the 
conditional matrices contained separate provisions on differ-
ent topics and processes targeting the forest sector, notably 
on gazetting, attribution and management, the next three 
subsections will discuss them separately.
Attribution and approval of management plans in 
FMUs
The number of attributed and classified FMUs, and the num-
ber of approved management plans, were all specific triggers 
linked to conditional financial disbursements through the 
SAPs. In the final years of the third and last SAP, MINFOF 
faced a lot of pressure, both internal and external, to deliver 
on agreed SAP matrices. This largely explains the 47 FMUs 
classified, the 34 FMUs attributed and the 41 management 
plans approved in 2004–2006 (FIGURE 1).
MINFOF’s quantitative performance was remarkable, 
especially since it had a chronic lack of staff, capacities 
and means to perform such intensive tasks as conducting the 
necessary negotiations prior to gazetting, or verifying the 
reliability of forest inventories. However, the rush to fulfil the 
conditional matrices had some notable negative impacts on 
the quality of outputs. For example, during the 2005 and 2006 
FMU attributions, “suspicious numbers of bidders [were] 
eliminated at the technical evaluation stage, and [the FMUs] 
awarded to the only remaining bidder at the floor price” (Topa 
et al. 2009, p.42). In other words, MINFOF chose to forego 
the revenues that the country could have gained from higher 
bids, and risked granting FMUs to companies not necessarily 
LAND DEEDS, FOREST MANAGEMENT UNITS AND 
TIMBER PRODUCTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
In Cameroon, forests on national lands are incorporated into 
the permanent forest domain in the form of protected areas 
and FMU (Assembe-Mvondo et al. 2014). The permanent 
forest domain covers about 16.3 million ha, of which about 
46% is covered by 114 FMUs (Global Forest Watch and 
MINFOF 2012). FMUs are thus the property of the state, once 
classified as state forests (art.24 and 25, Republic of Cameroon 
1994). For classification (or gazetting) of state forests to 
occur, a decree must be issued by the Prime Minister (art.17, 
Republic of Cameroon 1995). Such a decree determines, 
among others, the geographical boundaries of state forests 
and their category (FMU, protected area or otherwise). The 
decree also serves to establish a land certificate for the state. 
Once an FMU has been granted to a logging company, a 
temporary contract for a maximum duration of three years is 
signed between the Minister of Forests and the company. The 
temporary contract is non-renewable (art.66(2), Republic of 
Cameroon 1995). During the three years of the temporary 
contract, the company is mandated, among others, to (i) con-
duct a management inventory; (ii) draft a management plan 
for the entire area of the FMU and for the entire harvesting 
rotation period, which is generally set at 30 years; (iii) draft a 
five-year plan and an annual plan of operations with a detailed 
description of the operations to be conducted in the initial 
years of the harvesting cycle; and (iv) build and operate a 
sawmill neighbouring the granted FMUs to contribute to local 
employment, local processing and value addition.
Once all the requirements listed in the temporary contract 
are completed and verified, the Minister signs a certificate to 
confirm this, and the company is eligible for a permanent and 
definitive contract for the FMU concerned. The permanent 
contract lasts for 15 years and is renewable once. It is issued 
in the legal form of a forest concession, which may contain 
multiple FMUs, granted through a decree signed by the Prime 
Minister.
Once an FMU has been granted to a logging company, if 
the company wants to conduct harvesting operations, it must 
conduct an annual harvesting inventory on clearly delimited 
annual allowable cuts (AAC), measured in hectares and 
mapped in the management plan. Once the inventory has been 
validated by MINFOF, harvesting can start. Harvesting can 
occur on the same AAC for a maximum of two years, after 
which access roads to the AAC must be closed to prevent 
encroachment. 
The theoretical sequence of events suggested by the 
legislators and presented above follows a clear logic: first, the 
gazetting of an FMU; second, its attribution to a logging 
company; and third, actual harvesting operations. The process 
of gazetting should include consultations with the local popu-
lations about the planned FMUs’ boundaries (Topa et al. 
2009). After gazetting, logging companies would bid for 
FMUs with clearly defined boundaries. Within those bound-
aries, companies would then conduct a forest inventory, 
an environmental impact assessment, and further public 
consultations with the local populations in order to prepare a 
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willing to engage in long-term SFM practices. Similarly, the 
quality of many management plans was also wanting, with 
especially worrying gaps in the acknowledgment and defini-
tion of customary uses and rights (Vandenhaute and Doucet 
2006), and in the species selected for sustainable management 
(Cerutti et al. 2008). Yet, management plans were nonetheless 
approved. 
Land gazetting
The issue of land gazetting is at the heart of a fundamental 
lack of security in the forest sector. As of 2013, from a total 
of 114 FMUs across the country, Cameroon had 70 recorded 
as gazetted (covering about 4.6 million ha) and 80 with an 
approved management plan (covering about 5.3 million ha). 
However, because the two processes run in parallel, in the 
same year there were only 58 FMUs that were gazetted and 
also had an approved management plan (covering about 
4 million ha). 
Gazetting and having an approved management plan are 
two of the basic conditions required for logging companies to 
request a permanent contract.2 Without a permanent contract, 
logging companies have no legal security with regard to the 
boundaries of their FMUs and, implicitly, in the areas where 
they are required to make long-term investments. Under these 
conditions, most of the objectives set out in the forest policy 
over the past 20 years are based on a false premise. These 
considerations did not escape the attention of the country’s 
financial and technical partners, and in particular the World 
Bank, which had founded their engagement in the forestry 
sector on this premise.
In the discussions between MINFOF and the country’s 
partners that occurred after 2005–2006 (i.e. after the HIPC 
completion point) the issue of permanent contracts, or lack 
thereof, was constantly at the top of the agenda. It was one 
of the thorniest points discussed, at least until 2010–2011, 
when several donors, led by the World Bank, decided that 
the conditions set for their further support to the forest sector 
had not been met. Thus they abandoned their preeminent role 
in leading the reforms, leaving it largely to the EU and to 
Germany under the FLEGT agenda. By 2012, permanent 
contracts had been signed for only 22 FMUs. Of those, three 
had been abandoned and the remaining 19 included “a provi-
sion by the Government allowing for mining activities in the 
event of mines discovered in these [FMUs]” (World Bank 
2012, p.8).
Timber production, exports and logging titles
Over the years, the discourse about permanent contracts as 
a means towards the implementation of SFM was paralleled 
by a discourse on the shift that should have occurred from 
unsustainable to sustainable logging titles. Indeed, most exist-
ing planning documents from the 1990s and 2000s, produced 
2
 MINFOF has published public lists of granted FMUs and their status over the years. Those lists generally divide FMUs into temporary 
(provisoire) and permanent (définitive); however, for the latter group, the term “permanent” is used inappropriately for FMUs that either have 
an approved management plan, or are classified, or both. Only the 22 FMUs that actually have permanent contracts signed by the Prime 
Minister should legally fall into this group.
 FIGURE 1 Timeline of FMU gazetting, attribution or re-attribution, and management plan approval processes
FMU = forest management unit.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on MINFOF’s data.
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under SAPs, aim at phasing out logging titles – such as sales 
of standing volume (SSV) – which did not require manage-
ment plans or respect for sustainability criteria (e.g. MINEF 
1999, MINEF 2004).
The attribution of unsustainable titles in the 1990s could 
be considered a necessary evil for logging companies to be 
able to supply the sawmills they were building in fulfilment 
of the new legal requirements. As new legally attributed 
FMUs were promised by the law in 1994 but were not 
available until the 2000s, SSVs and similar authorizations 
(e.g. timber recovery permits, TRP) filled the gap in timber 
demand (Cerutti and Tacconi 2008).
Yet, data on attributed FMUs and SSVs/TRPs for 1998–
2015 present a similar pattern to that shown above for 
gazetted and attributed FMUs (FIGURE 1). Over the years 
MINFOF has tended to attribute more and more unsustain-
able titles, most notably since the release of donors pressure 
around 2006–2007. As a result, in 2014, for example, the area 
granted for timber harvesting through such titles was higher 
than that granted at the end of the 1990s and higher than the 
AAC granted to FMUs (FIGURE 2).
A similar disconnect between policy and practice also 
seems to exist between log exports and the 1994 targets of 
increased local processing and value addition. The 1994 law 
promised a log export ban to be enacted in 1999. The ban was 
indeed enacted in 1999, with a corresponding drop in log 
exports (FIGURE 3). Yet, contrary to expectations, it was 
only a partial ban, which left open the door to the export of 
“secondary species” (as they are referred to in the legislation). 
This oddly included a few of the most commonly harvested 
and exported species for many decades, such as ayous 
(Triplochiton spp.) and azobé (Lophira alata). Such imple-
mentation contradicted, as it does today, the promise to adopt 
policies that would favour both more and better local process-
ing, increased local investment, and the harvest and export of 
more “secondary” – also intended as less profitable – timber 
species.
The increasing trend in log exports during 2005–2014 
(FIGURE 3) can be attributed to three major proximate 
causes: (i) the increased number of unsustainable logging 
permits (SSV/TRP, FIGURE 2) granted in agro-forestry areas 
in the non-permanent forest domain to companies that do not 
have the processing capacity needed to produce sawn-wood 
and thus prefer exporting logs; (ii) exceptional measures 
adopted by the government to face the 2008 financial crisis 
(some of which are still active, such as reduced taxation 
on selected species); and (iii) a buoyant Asian market, which 
has historically been focussing on logs (as compared to 
sawn-wood) and also less selective than the European one in 
terms of demanded species (Cerutti et al. 2011). Hence, the 
Asian market, and notably China and Vietnam, has been able 
to capture the vast majority of the increasing volumes of logs 
produced from unsustainable logging permits. 
In addition to proximate causes, the political economy of 
the forest sector in Cameroon has played a significant role in 
influencing log exports. Several timber companies, especially 
those focussing on unsustainable permits and largely unwill-
ing or unable to mobilize the long-term investments needed 
to gain access to FMUs, exerted lobbying pressure on the 
government to relax log export restrictions. The power of 
such lobbying is enhanced by the fact that several members 
of Parliament, as well as government and army officials, 
SSV = sales of standing volume, TRP = timber recovery permit.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on MINFOF’s data.
F IGURE 2 Evolution of the annual allowable cuts granted in FMUs and SSVs/TRPs
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also own logging companies. These interests converge with 
those of the Ministry of Finance, for which one single tax-
collection point at the port of export (i.e. Douala) and thus 
taxes on log exports have always been easier to monitor and 
collect than those on processed products (HTR and MINEFI 
2005). 
Data indicate that sawn-wood, plywood and veneer 
production has remained stable for more than a decade, 
except during the financial crisis. Yet, Figure 3 also shows 
that log exports remain the most attractive activity for many 
producers. Processing activities do not yet generate important 
added-value, mainly because the quality of Cameroonian 
downstream production remains low. Investment in improved 
processing materials, wood technology and capacity develop-
ment has been inadequate in both the public and private 
sector. This leaves the industry in a primitive state, where 
exporting sawn-wood remains the main activity of most 
logging companies.
CONTRIBUTION TO THE ECONOMY AND REVENUE 
COLLECTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
Coming as they did against the background of a series of 
SAPs which imposed a lot of conditional matrices also on the 
forest sector, it is not surprising that a large part of the reforms 
of the 1990s focussed on increasing revenue collection by the 
state, decreasing rent by logging companies, and attracting 
foreign investment (Essama-Nssah and Gockowski 2000, 
Karsenty 2010). To that end, a new area fee and several 
volume-based taxes were introduced by the legislator. 
Although the area fee already existed under the previous 
forest code, one major innovation of the new regulations was 
– in addition to setting its value to that offered by logging 
companies for each FMU in a public auction – to mandate the 
redistribution of 50% of the area fee to rural councils and the 
villages where logging titles were located; the remaining 50% 
went to the Treasury. The aim was to ensure that exploitation 
of the forest contributed to improving rural livelihoods. 
Yet even in the case of the taxation system, as with land 
deeds and SFM, there has been a disconnect between theory 
and practice, or between the adoptions of rules and regula-
tions and their actual implementation. Indeed, two decades 
have not been enough to set up effective institutional struc-
tures, able to function properly and to achieve the initial 
purposes of the reforms. In 1998, within the framework of the 
SAP, the responsibility for collecting forest-related taxation 
was transferred from MINFOF to the Ministry of Finance. 
The change was introduced to streamline revenue collection 
at the national level, irrespective of the sector considered. To 
FIGU RE 3 Exports by product (1996–2015)
Note: In order to obtain the corresponding annual harvested production, processing rates of about 35% must be applied to sawn-wood, and of 
about 50% to both plywood and veneer.
Note: In 2003, the financial year was changed from Jul-Jun to Jan-Dec. Data before 2003 are thus reported in official documents as 
1996/1997, 1997/1998, etc.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on MINFOF’s data.
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Contribution to the national formal economy
In the framework of this Special Issue, three indicators are 
used here to capture the industrial timber sector’s contribution 
to the national economy: turnover, added value and employ-
ment. The same three indicators have been collected for all 
the other sub-sectors considered in the Special Issue, so that a 
coherent picture of the overall forest sector’s contribution to 
the national economy can be drawn.
The turnover of the formal forest industry is considered as 
the production recorded during each fiscal year. That is the 
entire industrial wood production output sold, stored or capi-
talized per year, regardless of its form. Generally it consists of 
exports of wood and wood-based panels from natural forests 
and wood used directly in the production process. During 
the last two decades the industrial forest sector realized an 
average annual turnover of about USD 600 million. 
The added value is considered here as the overall wealth 
generated by the industrial sector during a fiscal year. It is 
calculated as the difference between the turnover and the 
value of all goods and services consumed during production, 
created by intermediate sectors (intermediate consumption).3 
Data made available for this study show that the industry 
average added value was about USD 351 million in 2008–
2011, or about 1.5% of gross domestic product over the same 
period. Wages and expenses, specific forest taxation and 
general taxation contributed the largest part (about 60%).
Data also indicate that the timber industry (forest manage-
ment, timber processing and export) contributed to the 
creation of about 23 000 formal jobs in 2011, corresponding 
to about USD 96 million in personnel wages. This represented 
an increase from the 13 000 jobs recorded in 2006 (Karsenty 
2006). This increase could be attributed to the fact that the 
2006 data only took account of direct employment in harvest-
ing and processing, but it could also be partially linked to 
the increase in area harvested and logging permits granted in 
recent years.
Revenue collection
The quantity of forest-related taxes collected changed over 
the last two decades, as a result of changes to the fiscal system 
and to the forestry sector. Whereas the largest amount 
collected before 2000 was from log export tax, after 2000 the 
area fee, calculated on the bids made by logging companies 
and the area of their titles, became the single largest source of 
revenue collected (FIGURE 4). 
Following the 50% devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994, 
and before the implementation of the new forestry law (early 
2000s), companies increased the volume of wood they were 
that end, in March 1999 the Enhanced Forest Revenues Pro-
gramme (EFRP), an interministerial programme (MINFOF 
and Ministry of Finance), was established within the Ministry 
of Finance to ensure a rigorous monitoring of fiscal revenues 
in the timber sector, thus increasing its contribution to the 
state budget (Topa et al. 2009). However, creation of the 
EFRP had the drawback of physically separating two sets 
of primary data related to the forest sector, namely timber 
production and the collection of corresponding revenues, 
which could then only be reconciled if the two ministries were 
to establish strong collaborative links. In fact, collaboration 
remains sporadic and weak to this day (e.g. HTR and 
MINEFI 2005, PSRF 2014). 
In a declarative taxation system like the Cameroonian one, 
where logging companies declare the amounts they have to 
pay, and are only later possibly subject to official controls, 
such disconnect is a recipe for regular underperformance 
in terms of revenue collection. Also, it can become an easy 
channel for the laundering of illegal forest activities, as tax 
controllers can only verify whether the relevant taxes have 
been paid or not, but not, for example, the origin of the 
resource.
Lack of collaboration is just one factor undermining 
performance. In addition, the Ministry of Finance has con-
tinuously tried to adapt the forest sector to its fiscal needs, 
instead of building on MINFOF’s knowledge, which could be 
channelled through the EFRP. For example, while at inception 
the EFRP was responsible for collecting taxes from all 
logging companies, in 2004, 2006 and most recently in 2013 
its responsibilities were reduced, leaving it today with no 
tax-collection responsibility at all. Instead, the EFRP’s 
responsibilities for data collection and analysis have grown 
year after year, with no increase in personnel, means or 
political clout. Clearly established institutional channels do 
not exist for it to reach out to MINFOF and the various agen-
cies within the Ministry of Finance that are the repositories 
of original data and information (PSRF 2014).
These subsequent limitations imposed on the EFRP 
follow a path that goes in parallel with the trends highlighted 
in Figure 1, 2 and 3, i.e. reforms imposed under the SAPs 
were gradually but regularly dismantled over the years, to the 
detriment – we argue – of the entire forest sector. Indeed, 
those limitations have a practical negative impact on the 
quality and quantity of collected data, which remain partial, 
scattered across multiple agencies and irregularly distributed 
over the years. Notwithstanding these shortcomings and 
within the aim of this Special Issue, the following subsections 
present the status of the forest sector’s contribution to the 
national economy, as it can be gauged from available data.
3
 This is the accounting definition of added value. From an economic perspective, it might not be the best approach to assessing the performance 
of the industrial forest sector. As for timber processing, the intermediate consumption products are the logs. In national accounting, they are 
priced not at their opportunity cost (their potential market price) but at their production cost, if the industry is vertically integrated (which is 
largely the case in Cameroon). Pricing logs at their opportunity cost would often lower significantly the added value displayed in national 
accounts.
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the collection of volume-based taxes, such as the stumpage 
fee (FIGURE 4), which has however remained constant since 
then. Less successful was the impact on the sawmill entry tax 
(FIGURE 4), which was eventually abolished in 2013 and 
substituted with an export tax applied to exported processed 
products. The establishment of the EFRP also played an 
important role in bringing to light some previously unreported 
taxes and fees (e.g. value added tax, fines, taxes on employ-
ment, etc.). These were initially reported under the general 
banner of “other taxes”, and later on with clearer specifica-
tions. Yet, reporting is still far from optimal or regular, 
and large unexplained year-on-year variations are common 
(FIGURE 4).5
Although the trends in revenue collection might be seen 
as an improvement as compared to the pre-1994 situation, 
such numbers hide the clearest example of the disconnect 
between adopted policies and eventually implemented 
actions. The redistribution of revenues collected from the 
forestry sector was one of the most innovative and welcomed 
harvesting, in part because of the extremely favourable 
exchange rate, but also possibly in anticipation of future 
shortages created by the announced log export ban (enacted 
in 1999) (Ndoye and Kaimowitz 2000). This caused a rush to 
use unsustainable logging titles, as discussed above.
In 2001, the long-promised public auctions to grant FMUs 
were eventually implemented as a further requirement for the 
conditional disbursements under SAPs, and the government 
started collecting the area fee due on those FMUs. The reve-
nue generated from the area fee grew for several years 
(FIGURE 4), until almost all FMUs were granted. It plunged 
in 2008–2010 during the financial crisis because MINFOF 
adopted a special measure halving the area fee due from 
logging companies.4 It later recovered to pre-crisis levels and 
increased to an unprecedented high. This was the result of the 
increased number of SSVs being delivered (FIGURE 2) in 
addition to the more regular area fee income from FMUs.
At the beginning of the century, the streamlining of the 
roles and responsibilities of the EFRP seemed to bear fruit in 
FIGURE 4 Forest-related and total tax collection (1992–2014, corrected for inflation)
AF = area fee, SF = stumpage fee, SET = sawmill entry tax. 
Note: In 2003, the financial year was changed from Jul–Jun to Jan–Dec. Data before 2003 are thus reported in official documents as 
1991/1992, 1992/1993, etc.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on MINFOF’s data.
4
 Since the area fee is a fixed cost to companies, because it is paid on the entire FMU area irrespective of production or market conditions, 
MINFOF tried to ease the negative conditions experienced by the industrial forest sector during the crisis years.
5
 In the last decade, many estimates have been published (often by the Ministry of Finance) of the total contribution of the forestry sector 
to national revenues, but “other taxes” (autres taxes) have never been detailed nor explained as to their origin, and they often present huge, 
inexplicable variations from one year to the next.
The technical and political challenges of the industrial forest sector  35
targets introduced by the 1994 law. The idea was simple: half 
(50%) of the area fee paid by logging companies each year 
was to be redistributed to the councils (40%) and villages 
(10%) neighbouring logging concessions, as evidence that the 
exploitation of the forest could bring about improved rural 
livelihoods. The novelty of redistribution and the amounts 
involved have brought much scrutiny to the area fee, with 
most of the available literature agreeing on the scheme’s very 
poor performance and weak impacts on people’s livelihoods, 
especially because of many councils’ widespread embezzle-
ments and misuse of funds (e.g. Nzoyem et al. 2003, Morrison 
et al. 2009, Cerutti et al. 2010). 
Notwithstanding the large and increasing volume of 
evidence about weak results and mismanagement by some 
councils and mayors, over the years several decrees were 
adopted that changed the 40%–10% ratio several times (e.g. 
see Republic of Cameroon 2009, MINATD et al. 2010, 
MINATD et al. 2012), until eventually the 2015 finance law 
not only abrogated the 10% originally allocated to the rural 
populations, but also transferred it in the hands of councils 
and mayors, providing even more resources to the very insti-
tutions that have over the years proven unable to stimulate 
rural development, growth and improved livelihoods for their 
constituencies. Thus, about 15 years after initial implementa-
tion, the area fee has proven to be more a battleground for 
mayors and their political aspirations than a means to improve 
people’s livelihoods in areas affected by forestry operations.
DISCUSSION
Results indicate that some of the main objectives of the forest 
policy developed by Cameroon in the 1990s have yet to be 
reached, notably with regard to the contribution that the 
industrial forest sector should have made to SFM and to 
national and rural development. In particular, some basic 
preconditions that could facilitate an improved adoption of 
SFM by logging companies, although much talked about, 
have yet to be realized on a sizeable scale, such as permanent 
contracts and coherent fiscal policies that provide incentives 
for long-term investments. Other targets set forward by the 
1990s’ policies, such as further processing, value addition, 
increased revenues and better employment in the industrial 
forest sector, have had mixed results, for both technical and 
political reasons.
Technical reasons such as the quality and quantity of 
publicly available data and the lack of staff, resources and 
capacities of government departments to set up modern and 
interconnected forest information systems (which must 
include, among others, financial data) remain indeed a con-
cern (FODER 2015, Hoare 2015). We believe this concern 
is even more important today than it was in the 1990s, 
especially considering the high reliance that processes such 
as FLEGT or REDD+ will have on computerised timber 
traceability systems or real-time data systems to establish and 
monitor legality, SFM and forest and environmental base-
lines. Yet, technical reasons can only partially explain those 
mixed results and the gap that remains between the adoption 
and effective implementation of policies. The long and con-
tradicting history of the area fee’s redistribution, or the fact 
that timber production and financial data remain very much 
divided between two Ministries, for instance, speak more to 
the presence of powerful political interests in managing the 
concerned amounts, than to the lack of data or capacities. 
The lack of coherent long-term strategies and the overlap 
of political and financial interests that hamper such coherence 
to materialise are not, of course, peculiar to the forest sector. 
In fact, the forest sector is sometimes just the passive observ-
er of more powerful forces at play, as illustrated by the recent 
cases where mining or agribusiness companies had been 
granted permits inside FMUs with little consultation among 
the ministries of mines, agriculture and forests (e.g. Greeen-
peace and The Oakland Institute 2013). Similarly, other 
unjustified or unexplained delays in policy implementation, 
as in the case of permanent contracts, or implementation that 
contradicts the spirit of the law, as in the case of the area fee, 
are not entirely or not always directly under the responsibility 
of the MINFOF: Permanent contracts are under the responsi-
bility of the Prime Minister’s office, and decisions on the area 
fee redistributions have largely been taken by the Ministry 
of Finance.
Yet, such delays and contradictions do have detrimental 
impacts on the forest sector. For example, the lack of perma-
nent contracts after 36 months of operation makes the status 
of any logging company, its products and the FMUs produc-
ing the latter at best unclear and at worst illegal, unless the 
1994 law is changed. The Cameroonian government, and 
MINFOF in particular, have been banking on their engage-
ment with the FLEGT process, to improve the image of the 
country’s forest sector. And indeed, engagement with FLEGT 
and the regular and transparent production of data that it will 
require have also been used as evidence of goodwill and 
capacity in the international negotiations of other processes, 
such as REDD+. Ultimately, however, the long-standing 
uncertainties about permanent contracts, the unclear planning 
about the present and future use of unsustainable logging 
titles, the weak links that continue to exist with the Ministry 
of Finance, and the lack of inclusive public discussions on 
such topics tarnish this image and render the implementation 
of those processes – and the fulfilment of their long-term 
objectives – very difficult, whatever the internal political 
reasons for such delays and contradictions. 
In addition to the country’s international image, the same 
uncertainties and contradictions also have negative impacts 
on the private sector’s engagement with the international 
timber market, or at least on the most progressive logging 
companies, such as those engaged with forest certification 
schemes or those willing to publish transparent accounts 
of some of the taxes they pay. Despite the companies’ stated 
objectives and engagements under international, third-party 
verification standards, key steps remain that only a collabora-
tive government and clear political directions (e.g. in the form 
of improved regulations) can provide (Lambin et al. 2014), 
such as the granting of permanent contracts, the publication 
of transparent and regular data, or the effective redistribution 
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of benefits accrued from forest operations. Temporary solu-
tions that are more in sync with external requests from inter-
national technical or financial partners than with internal, 
well-thought long-term development objectives, and that 
leave logging companies in a legal limbo or uncertain about 
the direction that the sector is taking are not what the market 
or the final consumers want, eventually discouraging serious 
investment in the sector. 
All in all, these recurrent issues are further indication that 
the forest sector, despite more than two decades of progres-
sive ad-hoc regulations, is not yet integrated into a coherent 
set of broader and multi-sectorial political strategies and deci-
sions that consider it important for the future development 
of the country. This situation not only prevents MINFOF to 
play the important role that, we argue, it should have on the 
national political arena and in the development of cross-
sectorial approaches, but it also has environmental, financial 
and social impacts.
Environmentally, the long-term lack of reliable data (e.g. 
FODER 2015), unjustified or collusive decisions on the 
attribution of logging titles (e.g. CONAC 2012), and lack of 
clarity about how the sector is being managed, contribute 
to perpetuate an environment in which logging companies 
operate with a short-term, cut-and-run mentality. In such 
an environment, even the growing numbers of officially 
approved management plans or promises to only produce 
legal timber risk not stimulating future investments, unless 
backed up by serious monitoring efforts. For example, if one 
considers the past two decades, it is difficult to understand 
why the MINFOF would have technical problems in prepar-
ing FMPs – in fact a role that it has relinquished to logging 
companies since the adoption of the 1994 law – while it would 
not have the same technical problems in assessing both their 
quality and their actual financial, social and environmental 
impacts on the ground, tasks that would arguably require even 
more skills, improved curricula, and both financial and tech-
nical means. This, we argue, is where a clear and determined 
decision is needed if SFM has to assume a key role, not only 
for the future development of the industrial forest sector in 
Cameroon, but also for the engagements that the country is 
underwriting under international processes that will require, 
among others, the preparation of clear theories of change, 
the establishment of reference baselines, and detailed 
measurement of progress. For instance, independent third-
party contractors could be brought in to monitor the quality of 
management plans before approval, as well as their imple-
mentation on the ground once approved, possibly at regular 
intervals of 5 or 10 years, in line with the requirements of 
the law.
Financially, investments such as more comprehensive 
multi-resource inventories that consider the sustainable use of 
all floral and faunal resources, including those used by local 
populations in their customary activities, specialized teams 
dedicated to engagement with local populations and to the 
effective establishment of strong local forest governance 
structures or advanced processing facilities, require a long-
term vision that the current situation does not encourage. 
Obviously, all these considerations could affect the profitabil-
ity of the sector and detailed analyses should be conducted 
to understand when and where improved policies could be 
adopted and who should bear responsibility for implementa-
tion. Yet, such improved policies could only be seriously 
discussed when the disconnect between what the government 
technically adopts and what it actually implements disap-
pears, or at least decreases to a lower level than the current 
one. 
Socially, the issue here is mainly one of transparency and 
public availability of information, notably for Cameroonians 
who expect the industrial forest sector to contribute to 
improving their livelihoods. Nothing is inherently wrong with 
attributing unsustainable logging titles that are in accordance 
with the law, if technical or political considerations so dictate. 
But the public need to be given sound reasons as to why one 
choice has been made over another, and what consequences 
such decisions may have on the future development of the 
forest sector and on their livelihoods. For instance, an 
increase of the area fee collected through unsustainable 
logging titles because of the large bids made by logging 
companies for those titles, as it occurred in recent years, can 
surely be reported as good news for the Treasury and for the 
MINFOF, as it has several times been done in the national 
press (e.g. Bainkong 2014). Yet, because of their very nature, 
unsustainable logging titles are a very short-term investment 
and cannot provide sustained income to the Treasury or 
long-term benefits to the rural populations. In fact, large bids 
may even indicate a dwindling resource and thus decreased 
livelihoods opportunities in the near future.
Cross-sectorial, inclusive, regular and informed discus-
sions about these strategic issues are sadly lacking in the 
national arena. Instead, such discussions as do take place in 
the forest sector, often take the form of publicly aired 
conflicts between civil society organizations and MINFOF 
(e.g. Greenpeace 2015, Ngole Ngwese 2015), causing further 
reputational damage to the sector. 
CONCLUSIONS
The research conducted for this paper is testimony to the 
existence of several technical and political challenges that 
characterise the industrial forest sector in Cameroon. Results 
indicate that many among such challenges have persisted over 
the years, notwithstanding the different social and macro-
economic backgrounds in which the sector has been evolving 
over the past two decades. In particular, results point to a 
recurrent gap between public commitments, laws and regula-
tions (e.g. on SFM, value-addition, benefit-sharing, and trans-
parency among others), and their effective implementation 
and monitoring on the ground. Commitments and new regula-
tions, be they made or adopted under FLEGT (e.g. MINFOF 
2015) or any other process to which the country decides to 
subscribe (e.g. REDD+), are positive and must be supported. 
They must however also be effectively implemented and 
monitored for the sector to gain the legitimacy it deserves and 
that is currently lacking.
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More research is certainly needed on the processes that 
could help strengthening political will so that policy objec-
tives are translated into reality on the ground (Brinkerhoff 
2010). Yet, some available ways forward seem readily avail-
able in the case of Cameroon. For instance, signing a larger 
number of permanent contracts with progressive logging 
companies that have a proven willingness to invest in SFM 
(e.g. they voluntarily engage in forest certification), or index-
ing the area fee to the average price of a basket of species, 
representative of Cameroonian production, in order to lower 
the risk for the industry in relation to market downturns (e.g. 
Karsenty 2010), or effectively redistributing forest-related 
monetary benefits to the local populations, would already 
send a strong signal to international markets, lenders and the 
private sector. If more valuable land use alternatives – which 
may include alternative models of forest management – 
become available, or if the economic model based on exten-
sive logging of timber mainly for export purposes does 
not prove to be viable, then fair compensation can always 
be discussed later on among the local populations, logging 
companies and the government. 
In addition, MINFOF, in collaboration with the Ministry 
of Finance, should acknowledge that longer-term investment 
is needed for FMUs as compared to unsustainable logging 
titles, and legislate accordingly. This would be a great 
improvement to the current situation, where promises of value 
addition, local processing, employment and long-term local 
benefits have largely remained unfulfilled. In fact, under cur-
rent conditions, the granting of many short-term unsustain-
able permits may send a signal to logging companies that they 
may divest from long-term commitments, such as FMUs and 
SFM, and move towards short-term, unsustainable ones. 
Given the current situation, with only a handful of compa-
nies seriously engaged in forest certification, the prospects for 
encouraging companies to practice SFM are poor, unless a 
well-considered framework of incentives and disincentives 
can be established. Several alternative schemes could be 
adopted, the ultimate goal being that companies showing 
clear signs of willingness to engage in long-term SFM, and 
ready to be regularly monitored by an independent third-
party, should also be rewarded for their efforts in the short-
term. For instance, unsustainable permits might be directed to 
partly fill the growing national demand for timber, currently 
fulfilled by a thriving artisanal, albeit informal sector 
(Cerutti et al. 2013). Or a national procurement policy could 
be adopted that requires at least “legal” timber to be sourced, 
with possible premium prices for the public purchasing of 
legal and sustainable timber. This would raise the bar for the 
owners of unsustainable permits, and it would target effec-
tively managed FMUs while creating new outlets for respon-
sible concessionaires. Instead, under current conditions that 
maintain a large gap between what is promised in the regula-
tions and what is done on the ground, companies wanting to 
invest in the long term face unfair competition from those 
who exploit short-term permits and are ready to move on to 
other sectors or other countries once the resource is depleted.
More broadly, such policies would also be a positive step 
to solve one of the major dilemmas facing the proponents of 
legal timber production processes, now prominent in interna-
tional forest governance debates, to which Cameroon is fully 
committed. They would help establish a clear difference 
between legal and sustainable vs. legal and unsustainable 
timber, a difference that is today difficult to grasp on the 
international markets (Masiero et al. 2015), but that is funda-
mental for a broader adoption of SFM in tropical forests that 
is also understood and supported by international consumers 
who care for the future of those forests and the livelihoods 
they sustain.
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